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Phase-Only Digital Encryption
Jonathan Blackledge, Western Govere and Dumisani Sibanda
Abstract—We study the n-dimensional deconvolution prob-
lem associated with an impulse response function and an
(additive) noise function that are both characterised by the
same phase-only stochastic spectrum. In this case, it is shown
that the deconvolution problem becomes well-posed and has a
general solution that is both exact and unique, subject to a
re-normalisation condition relating to the scale of the solution.
While the phase-only spectral model considered is of limited
value in general (in particular, problems arising in the fields
of digital signal processing and communications engineering,
specifically with regard to the retrieval of information from
noise), its application to digital cryptography has potential.
One of the reasons for this (as discussed in this paper),
is that it provides a method of encrypting data where the
diffused plaintext can be effectively embedded in a (phase-only)
cipher (subject to the floating point precision used for data
processing), thereby fully dissipating the statistical signature
of the plaintext in the distribution of the cipher. Further,
a decrypt can be generated that is computationally efficient
subject to the usual cases of sender and receiver having
access to identical algorithm(s) and key(s), deconvolution being
equivalent to decryption in the context of the (phase-only)
encryption model that is considered. For the two-dimensional
case, this approach has a potential weakness in terms of a
‘correlation attack’ using phase retrieval algorithms and a
solution to this problem is provided by introducing a (stochastic)
amplitude weighting function. Prototype MATLAB functions
are provided in the Appendices that accompany this paper to
give readers the opportunity to repeat the computational results
presented and extend them further. The functions constitute a
symmetric algorithm for encrypting and decrypting full colour
images in which the key(s) have been exchanged a priori. In this
context, the final part of the paper considers the application
of phase-only encryption for key exchange using a Three-
way Pass Protocol for which a further prototype MATLAB
function is provided for validation and further development of
the approach by interested readers.
Index Terms—Deconvolution, phase-only spectrum, stochas-
tic phase-only functions, cryptanalysis, image encryption, key
exchange algorithm, three-way pass protocol, post-quantum
cryptography.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE deconvolution problem (for additive noise) hasbeen studied widely and is known to be an ill-posed
problem in general with no exact solutions, thereby requiring
the application of regularisation techniques to obtain an
approximation, subject to certain conditions and criteria, e.g.
[1] and [2]. However, in special cases, exact and unique
solutions are available, and, in this paper, we consider the
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deconvolution problem for the case when both the Impulse
Response Function (IRF) and (additive) noise function are
characterised by a phase-only spectrum, deriving an exact
and unique solution subject only to a re-normalisation con-
dition. While this case is not relevant to general purpose
applications in signal and image processing, for example, it
does have applications in the field of cryptography, namely,
phase-only digital encryption.
A. Background and Purpose
We consider a method of encryption using a phase-only
spectrum characterised by a stochastic phase function. This
approach has been studied previously by many authors but
the focus of such studies has almost exclusively been on
optical information security systems and optical encryption,
e.g. [3] and [4]. This includes the use of generalised phase-
contrast methods implemented using liquid-crystal spatial
light modulators to generate binary phase-encrypted masks
and phase-only encryption schemes using phase-encoded
exclusive-OR rules in the Fourier plane for single path de-
cryption [5]. Phase-only encryption based on phase-shifting
interferometry has also been considered [6] although this
approach has recently been shown to have critical security
issues using ciphertext-only attacks when the ciphertext(s)
can be cracked directly without the keys of the cryptosystem
[7]. Thus, while phase-only encryption has and continues to
be implemented in optics, judging from the open literature,
a generic approach to phase-only digital encryption (which
facilitates numerical and programmable concepts which are
not feasible in optical cryptography) does not appear to
have been studied, and, in this context, to the best of the
author’s knowledge, the ideas and results presented in this
paper represent an original contribution to the field. Further,
using a digital approach to phase-only encryption provides
a solution to ciphertext-only attacks that can not be readily
implemented optically. Such a solution is considered in this
paper following a cryptanalysis of the algorithms developed
for encrypting full-colour digital images.
B. Structure of Paper
We consider a phase-only digital encryption scheme, pre-
senting the theoretical framework for phase-only deconvolu-
tion in n-dimensions. Section II briefly introduces the princi-
ples of encryption and the convolutional encoding/encryption
model which is the underlying basis for the work reported.
Section III introduces the principal theorems (specifically
Theorem III.1 and associated Corollary’s) upon which the
algorithms development is based. The application of Theo-
rem III.1 for phase-only encryption is the subject of Section
IV which is coupled with a statistical analysis as considered
in Section V. The cryptanalysis associated with phase-only
digital encryption is given in Section VI which illustrates the
potential weakness of the approach under a phase retrieval
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attack for which a solution is proposed. Generic encryption
and decryption algorithms are then considered in Section
VII with Section VIII providing some example results and
a short study based on prototype MATLAB functions for
encrypting and decrypting full colour digital images, the
MATLAB functions being presented in Appendix B. Section
IX then explores the application of phase-only encryption
for key exchange using a three-pass protocol. The software
development and its use is qualified in Section X with
concluding statements, related issues and future directions
being presented in Section XI. The overall purpose of this
paper is to explore the theoretical background and relative
simplicity of implementing digital phase-only encryption, its
diversity in regard to numerical implementation and some
example applications. Such applications can potentially be
coupled to existing encryption and encrypted information
hiding schemes including those that may be considered to
be associated with post-quantum cryptography as briefly
explored in this paper.
II. ENCRYPTION MODELS
The models studied in this paper apply to any dimensions
n and we therefore consider a theoretical development for
the multi-dimensional case. Thus, for a square integrable n-
dimensional function f(r) ∈ L2(Rn) : C → C, we define
the Fourier and inverse Fourier transforms in ‘non-unitary’
form as
F (k) = Fn[f(r)] ≡
∞∫
−∞
f(r) exp(−ik · r)dnr
and
f(r) = F−1n [F (k)] ≡
1
(2pi)n
∞∫
−∞
F (k) exp(ik · r)dnk
respectively where k is the spatial frequency vector and k ·
r = k1r1 + ... + knrn. These integral transforms define an
(n-dimensional) Fourier transform pair which we write using
the notation
F (k)↔ f(r)
where r ≡| r | and k ≡| k |. Further, we define the n-
dimensional delta function as
δn(r) = F−1n [1] ≡
1
(2pi)n
∞∫
−∞
exp(ik · r)dnk (1)
and consider a space invariant linear system characterised by
the equation
s(r) = p(r)⊗ f(r) + n(r) ≡
∞∫
−∞
p(r− r′)f(r′)dnr′ + n(r)
(2)
where [s(r), p(r), f(r), n(r)] ∈ L2(Rn) : C → C and ⊗
denotes the n-dimensional convolution integral.
In Equation (2), s(r) is the output of the system (the
‘signal’), p(r) is the characteristic IRF of the system (i.e. the
output signal obtained when f(r) = δn(r) and n(r) = 0)
associated with the detection of the information function
f(r) and n(r) is a stochastic function which denotes the
‘noise’ associated with a measurement of the signal s(r).
The stochastic function n(r) is assumed to have some
characteristic Probability Density Function (PDF) denoted
by Pr[n(r)] and may be taken to be a complex multivariate
PDF composed from the real and imaginary components of
n(r), interpreted in terms of the joint distribution of two
real random variables. Unlike n(r), p(r) and f(r) are taken
to be deterministic functions. Thus, the signal s(r) is the
sum of a deterministic function p(r)⊗ f(r) and a stochastic
function n(r). Equation (2) is the ‘standard model’ for a
multi-dimensional signal and assumes that the system it
describes is stationary.
A. Encryption Models
A simple encryption model can be interpreted in terms of
the signal being given by the sum of the information function
f(r) and noise function n(r), expressed as
s(r) = f(r) + n(r) (3)
where all functions are typically, but not exclusively, taken to
be real. Equation (3), represents the case when p(r) = δn(r)
in Equation (2). Under ‘natural conditions’ such as the
transmission of f(r) through an additive noisy environment,
the noise can not be controlled, only classified; specifically,
but not exclusively, in terms of its statistical distribution and
moments thereof. However, in the field of cryptography, the
noise term is under the control of the cryptographer and
Equation (3) can be interpreted through the following terms:
Ciphertext = Plaintext + Cipher
where the cipher (typically a data stream composed of
pseudo-random numbers) is generated by some key depen-
dent algorithm so that we can write
Algol(key)→ n(r)
Here, the notation → is taken to mean that the output of
Algol(key) is the noise function n(r). In this context, there
are two principal problems that are common to all digital
encryptions systems, namely, given that Alice and Bob have
the same algorithm Algol(key):
• How should Alice and Bob agree upon the key(s) used
in the cipher generating algorithm - the ‘Key Exchange
Problem’?
• How can we make an algorithm produce suitable noise
- the ‘Cryptographic Strength Problem’?
B. Integer and Binary Encryption
In the context of Equation (3), it is clear that decryption
of the ciphertext is trivial and given by
f(r) = s(r)− n(r)
If the functions s(r), f(r) and n(r) are now taken to be
discrete n-dimensional floating point arrays, then we can
consider this result to be an example of floating point
encryption/decryption where the floating point accuracy is
taken to be given by the limited bit representation available.
By way of an example, for r ∈ R1, when the functions
in question are denoted by the vectors s, f and n where
each vector is taken to be composed of an equal number
of floating-point elements with a precision of p-bits say, the
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floating-point space encryption/decryption process is given
by
Encryption : s = f + n; Decryption : f = s− n
For the case when the vectors s, f and n consist of inte-
ger values, the process is of course identical, and, more
specifically, for a 7-bit ASCII, the integer space encryp-
tion/decryption process is given by
Encryption : s = (f + n)mod(127)
Decryption : f = (s− n)mod(127)
where mod denotes the standard modulo operation. Further,
if we consider the vectors to be the binary streams sb, fb and
nb, respectively, each consisting of an equal number of bits,
then the binary space encryption/decryption process is given
by
Encryption : sb = fb ⊕ nb; Decryption : fb = sb ⊕ nb
where ⊕ is the standard Exclusive OR operator.
C. Floating Point and Analogue Encryption
Compared to integer and binary based encryp-
tion/decryption, it is important to appreciate that if
Alice and Bob encrypt plaintext using a cipher with a p-bit
floating point precision data processor and an attack is
attempted using q-bit floating point precision where q < p,
then, providing the computation of the cipher by Alice and
Bob exploits the full ‘floating point depth’ available with
p-bits, a decrypt can not be generated directly by an attacker
‘armed’ with a q-bit precision processor. This is due to
a lack of the floating point precision required to decrypt
a p-bit precision ciphertext. This issue naturally leads on
to the potential use of analogue computing for generating
analogue ciphers which may or otherwise be digitised.
Although a detailed account of analogue encryption lies
beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth stating that
this approach is used in military communications and has
potential applications when the key exchange problem is not
an issue. Such a scenario occurs when Alice and Bob wish
to archive data on the cloud when key exchange algorithms
become irrelevant as in this case Alice and Bob can encrypt
their data using their own key(s) without the need to
exchange them between themselves with any other third
party. In this case, the potential exists to exploit specialist
embedded analogue devices for exclusive use in localised
cloud security [17]. In the interim and/or in parallel, users
can develop their own digital floating-point algorithms
using, for example, the approach taken by Blackledge et
al. [9]in which personalised ciphers can be designed using
evolutionary computing for, amongst other applications,
encrypting ‘data on the cloud’.
D. Diffusion and Confusion
An important aspect in the development of encryption
algorithms, at least within the context of a given encryption
model, is the condition of maximising the levels of Confusion
and Diffusion in any transformation of an (input) plaintext
to an (output) ciphertext. Confusion refers to making the
correlation between the key and the ciphertext as complex
and intricate as possible. Diffusion refers to the property
that the redundancy in the statistical distribution of the
plaintext is dissipated in the distribution of the ciphertext
[18]. Ideally, what is required is a process that outputs a
uniformly distributed ciphertext. The process of encrypting
data using a specific cipher (with a known distribution) and
a specific encryption process, does not always guarantee
an output ciphertext that is uniformly distributed. However,
what matters most is that the distribution of the plaintext is
dissipated effectively over the full extent of the plaintext.
Given Equation (2), we consider the following encryption
model which is based on replacing the IRF p(r) with the
noise function n(r) leading to the equation
s(r) =
Stochastic Confusion︷ ︸︸ ︷
n(r) ⊗ f(r)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Stochastic Diffusion
+ n(r) (4)
This encryption model is the foundation upon which the
methods considered in this paper are constructed. It is an
approach whereby the signal is taken to be the result of the
sum of the noise and the transformation of the information
function f(r) by the same noise function n(r), the transfor-
mation being based on the convolution operation and thereby
representing a form of convolutional encoding. We refer to
the convolution operation n(r) ⊗ f(r) as the process of
(stochastic) diffusion and the addition of n(r) as the process
of (stochastic) confusion as illustrated in Equation (4). In this
case, both terms on the RHS of Equation (4) are stochastic
functions.
Stochastic diffusion is ‘maximised’ by ensuring that n(r)
is uniformly distributed statistically with a uniformly dis-
tributed Power Spectral Density Function (PSDF). Maximum
confusion is determined by the extent to which n(r) domi-
nates s(r) which we can express in terms of the condition
‖n(r)⊗ f(r)‖p << ‖n(r)‖p
where the p-norm is defined as
‖f(r)‖p ≡
∫
Rn
| f(r) |2 dnr
 1p , 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞
with the uniform norm being defined by
‖f(r)‖∞ = sup{| f(r) |, r ∈ Rn}
We note that, via the Convolution Theorem, Equation (4) can
be written in n-dimensional Fourier space as
S(k) = N(k)[1 + F (k)]
where
S(k) = Fn[s(r)], F (k) = Fn[f(r)] and N(k) = Fn[n(r)]
E. Fundamental Cryptographic Law
Irrespective of the cryptographic model that is used, there
is a fundamental law of cryptography which is a unifying
principle in regard to securing against any successful attack.
The law is that any encryption process should be undertaken
using: One message, one key, one algorithm. This law
underpins the use of a One-Time Pad (OTP), which yields
ciphertexts that are:
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(i) computationally secure, i.e. secure given an upper
bound on the computational capabilities of an attacker;
(ii) unconditionally secure, i.e. secure whatever the com-
putational power of the attacker.
It is in the context of this law that we consider the encryp-
tion/decryption of information using a (digital) phase-only
approach.
The cryptographic law stated above can be extended to
cases when it is required to hide the ciphertext in other
data types, namely, a covertext. In this case, the law is
extended to: One message, one key, one algorithm, one
covertext which underpins the field of Steganocryptography
[8]. The issue of using one algorithm to generate a cipher
is not conventional as most algorithms require a significant
input to be constructed, their numerical characteristics being
fundamental to the cryptographic strength of the encryption
system in which they are used and open to public scrutiny
(usually within the cryptographic community). Constructing
personalised encryption algorithms has been considered in
[9], for example, which uses evolutionary computing to
generate an encryption algorithm that approximates a finite
stream of natural noise. As with the exchange of keys, there
is the issue of how different algorithms can be exchanged. In
regard to this issue, a three-way pass protocol is considered
in Section IX of this work which, although focused on
the exchange of keys used for execution of the encryption
functions presented in this paper, can equally well be used to
exchange a personalised encryption algorithm (or any other
plaintext). In principle, point (ii) above includes the use of
quantum computers and underpins the field of post-quantum
cryptography as brifly discussed on the following section.
F. Post-quantum Cryptography
The cryptographic strength of an encryption algorithm
usually reflects on how difficult it is to break a cipher and
has traditionally been evaluated in terms of measures that
are related to the conventional computing power available at
the time the algorithm was designed. It has been known for
some time that the majority of popular public-key encryption
algorithms can be efficiently broken by a sufficiently pow-
erful quantum computer. However, until recently, quantum
computing was a hypothetical concept and so the idea
of breaking legacy encryption algorithms using quantum
computers was only of theoretical interest. Basic quantum
computers now exist in many research laboratories across
the world and a range of companies and governments have
research programs in the field. For this reason, post-quantum
cryptography, which is concerned with the development
of encryption algorithms that are considered secure even
against an attack by a quantum computer, is starting to
come of age [10]. Thus, new projects such as the ‘Open
Quantum Safe’ project, initiated in late 2016 [11], have been
established with the goal of developing quantum-resistant
encryption algorithms. This includes the development of
an open source library of post-quantum schemes and C
functions for quantum-resistant encryption algorithms with
an initial focus on key exchange algorithms. This is because
legacy key exchange algorithms are particularly vulnerable to
quantum computers, a consequence that relates to the legacy
of using modular arithmetic with prime numbers and that all
modular arithmetic functions are characterised be repeating
periods.
Quantum computers are destined to make legacy encryp-
tion methods redundant although a realistic time scale for
this is not clear. One of the principle concerns is the potential
redundancy of the RSA algorithm which can be ‘broken’ by
application of the Shor algorithm [12]. Originally developed
by Peter Shor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology in
1994 for prime number factorisation, the algorithm leads
to an exponentiation of the computing time required as
the prime numbers (whose factors are required) increases
in size due primarily to the period finding step in Shor’s
algorithm. However, used in conjunction with a quantum
computer, and, by exploiting the properties of the quantum
Fourier transform, the algorithm can be implemented very
effectively, the problem becoming equivalent to the quantum
phase estimation problem [13]. In addition to having the
potential to make many legacy digital encryption methods
redundant, quantum computing has the potential to provide
new methods for encrypting data. This includes dealing
with quantum multi-level secret sharing schemes to encrypt
quantum states with access structures for decryption [14],
for example. In this context, phase-only encryption is one
of a number of approaches that is crucially not related to
prime number based cryptography; it is a floating point based
form of encryption and has application to key-exchange as
discussed in Section IX. In this sense, the work reported in
this paper may be considered to play a part in the arena of
post-quantum cryptography, although a detailed exposition
of this lies beyond the scope of the current work.
III. DECONVOLUTION FOR PHASE-ONLY FUNCTIONS
Given Equation (4), it is clear that in order to decrypt the
signal s(r) to recover f(r), it is necessary to deconvolve s(r)
given the cipher n(r). It is well known that the deconvolution
problem is, in generally, an ill-posed problem with a wide
range of primarily conditional solutions. Application of a
phase-only cipher solves this issue thereby allowing both
encryption and decryption to be performed efficiently subject
to the encryption model compounded in Equation (4). This
result is the fundamental ‘key’ to phase-only encryption, as
compounded in the following theorem.
Theorem III.1. If n(r) has a phase-only spectrum, then
the deconvolution problem associated with Equation (4) is
well-posed, i.e. f(r) can be recovered from s(r) exactly and
uniquely, except for the value of f(r = 0) which remains
undefined.
Proof: Let Θ(k) be the phase function of a unit ampli-
tude phase-only spectrum such that
exp[iΘ(k)] = N(k) = Fn[n(r)]
Applying the convolution theorem to Equation (4), we can
write
S(k) = exp[iΘ(k)]F (k) + exp[iΘ(k)]
and it is then clear that
exp[−iΘ(k)]S(k) = F (k) + 1
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Hence, using the correlation theorem (where  denotes the
n-dimensional correlation integral) and Equation (1) we have
f(r) + δn(r) = n∗(r) s(r) ≡
∞∫
−∞
n∗(r+ r′)s(r′)dnr′
However, since the function δn(r) only effects the value of
f(r) at r = 0 and has no influence for all values of r > 0,
we can write
f(r) = n∗(r) s(r), r > 0
or alternative, setting the value for f(r) to zero at r = 0
(which we call the ‘re-normalising condition’),
f(r) = n∗(r) s(r), f(r = 0) = 0 (5)
Corollary III.1. Given that
S(k) = exp[iΘ(k)]F (k) + exp[iΘ(k)]
and since ‖ exp[iΘ(k)]‖∞ = 1, then using Minkowski’s
inequality [15] for the sum of two functions, it follows that
‖S(k)‖∞ ≤ 1 + ‖F (k)‖∞
Corollary III.2. Let f(r) ∃ ∀r ∈ Rn be of compact support
Rn. If we then consider the ratio
R =
‖n(r)⊗ f(r)‖p
‖n(r)‖p
it is clear that R ≥ 0 is a measure of the Signal-to-Noise
Ratio (SNR) since, using Minkowski’s inequality together
with Young’s inequality for the convolution of two functions
[16],
‖s(r)‖p = ‖n(r)⊗ f(r) + n(r)‖p
≤ ‖n(r)⊗f(r)‖p+‖n(r)‖p ≤ ‖n(r)‖p×‖f(r)‖p+‖n(r)‖p
leading to the inequalities
‖s(r)‖p
‖n(r)‖p ≤ 1 +R and R ≤ ‖f(r)‖p
Hence, if we consider the equation
s(r) = n(r)⊗ f(r) + cn(r)
where c = (1 + R)−1 then, from Theorem III.1, it is clear
that Equation (5) can be generalised to the form
f(r) = n∗(r) s(r), f(r = 0) = 0, ∀ c > 0
This means that f(r), ∀r > 0 can be uniquely recovered
from s(r) whatever the magnitude of the SNR which we define
as 1 + R, i.e. however small the value of the SNR becomes
or equivalently, however large the value of c becomes.
Remark III.1. Corollary III.2 is a theoretical result associ-
ated with piecewise continuous functions, and, the statement
‘however large the value of c becomes’ is null and void for
applications involving numerical operations on finite discrete
arrays. As discussed later on in this paper (in Section VIII.B),
the value of c has an upper bound subject to the floating point
precision available, i.e. the numerical value of c used places
limits on the accuracy to which a discrete form of f(r) can
be deconvolved from a discrete version f s(r), both functions
being taken to be Nyquist sampled.
Remark III.2. The result compounded in Theorem III.1 and
Corollary III.2 is of little value to the deconvolution problem
in general which occurs in the applications of digital signal
and image processing, for example. This is because it can
not be assumed that the IRF has a stochastic phase-only
spectrum, i.e. P (k) = Fn[p(r)] 6= N(k) = exp[iΘ(k)].
Further, natural noise can not, in general, be assumed to
be characterised by phase-only functions. Thus it should be
understood that Theorem III.1 is strictly only applicable to
the convolution model given in Equation (4) when n(r) has
a phase-only spectrum and has no applicability to signal
processing in general. However, the result given in Corollary
III.2 does have applications in the area of cryptography.
This is because the diffused plaintext n(r) ⊗ f(r) can be
completely embedded in a (phase-only) cipher cn(r) (for
c >> 1) thereby fully dissipating the statistical signature of
the diffused plaintext in the distribution of the cipher.
Remark III.3. Theorem III.1 can be generalised further by
considering an encryption model of the form
s(r) = m(r)⊗ f(r) + n(r)
where m(r) is a secondary phase-only stochastic function
such that
m(r)↔ exp[iΦ(k)], Φ(k) 6= Θ(k)
In this case, F (k) is given by (following the proof of
Theorem III.1 as given)
F (k) = exp[−iΦ(k)]S(k)− exp[−iΦ(k)] exp[iΘ(k))]
and, via the correlation theorem,
f(r) = m∗(r) s(r)−m∗(r) n(r)
Now, providing m(r) is statistically independent of n(r),
then in the asymptotic limit r → ∞, we can expect that
m∗(r)  n(r) → 0. However, this result is not as viable
as is the case when m(r) = n(r) considered in Theorem
III.1. This is because in Theorem III.1, the deconvolution
for f(r) is exact and unique ∀r > 0. In the case when
m(r) 6= n(r), the deconvolution for f(r) can, in practice,
be expected to be characterised by additive noise associated
with the correlation function m∗(r)n(r) and is therefore an
exact but not a unique result, i.e. f(r) is exactly recovered via
the correlation function m∗(r)s(r) but is non-unique due to
the perturbation of this function by the function m∗(r)n(r).
IV. ENCRYPTION USING PHASE-ONLY STOCHASTIC
FUNCTIONS
Consider a generic encryption model based on the linear
stationary convolution equation for plaintext f(r), cipher
n(r) and ciphertext s(r) given by
s(r) = n(r)⊗ f(r) + cn(r) (6)
where c is a real positive constant and
n(r)↔ exp[iΘ(k)], Θ(k) ∈ [−pi, pi]
noting that n(r) is a complex function but that f(r) may be
real or complex. We consider the function n(r) to be a cipher
generated by some key dependent algorithm characterised by
a phase-only spectrum with a random phase function Θ(k)
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and PDF Pr[n(r)]. In this context, we refer to the convolution
operation n(r)⊗ f(r) as the process of stochastic diffusion
and the addition of noise through the term cn(r) as the
process of stochastic confusion, terms which have previously
been introduced and discussed Section II.D. For a plaintext
function f(r) that is taken to be real, the ciphertext is taken
to be given by Re[s(r)] and has some PDF Pr{Re[s(r)]}.
In Fourier space, Equation (6) becomes
S(k) = F (k) exp[iΘ(k)] + c exp[iΘ(k)] (7)
and it is clear that the value of c controls the magnitude of the
term exp[iΘ(k)] compared with the term F (k) exp[iΘ(k)]
and as c increases in magnitude, the spectrum S(k) becomes
dominated by the phase-only spectrum exp[i(Θ(k)]. Thus by
choosing a large value for c (which is quantified later) we
can ‘embed’ the spectrum F (k) exp[iΘ(k)] in the phase-
only spectrum exp[iΘ(k)] in the knowledge that F (k) can
be recovered exactly as a consequence of Corollary III.2.
The constant c is a measure of SNR−1 which we refer to
as the ‘Spectral Embedding Coefficient’. It may be classified
in terms of a conventional Decibel scale for the SNR via
the equation
cdB = 10 log10(c) (8)
This result is invariant of the stochastic phase function
Θ(k) that is chosen for c >> 1. The output will be dom-
inated by the stochastic behaviour associated with the PDF
of n(r) thereby ‘eliminating’, in the output, the ‘statistical
signature’ associated with the term n(r) ⊗ f(r) which is
dependent on the information function f(r). Thus the distri-
bution of the plaintext is well dissipated in the distribution of
the cipher through both convolution (diffusion) and addition
(confusion). However, for c >> 1, addition of the cipher
is the dominating effect, maximising confusion which in
practice, is subject to the floating point accuracy required to
give a decrypt with an acceptable accuracy (to be quantified
in Section VIII.B). It is this observation that is fundamental
to using Theorem III.1 for encryption, yields the algorithms
considered in Section VII and can be considered to be a form
of data hiding, e.g. [19], [20], [21] and [22].
V. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Given that the function s(r) in Equation (6) is the sum
of two terms, it is informative to investigate the expected
PDFs of the real parts of these terms, i.e. the real parts of
f(r)⊗n(r) and n(r), noting that f(r) is assumed to be real
and Re[n(r)] is taken to have a PDF Pr{Re[n(r)]} with at
least a finite variance.
Consider the first term and the application of a δn-
sequence model for f(r) given by
f(r1, ..., rn) =
∞∑
m1=−∞
...
∞∑
mn=−∞
c(m1, ...,mn)
× δ(r1 −m1)...δ(rn −mn)
(9)
where f(r) is taken to be a piecewise continuous function
and c(m1, ...,mn) are real coefficients. Taking the PDF to
be a function of the independent variable ξ, say, application
of the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) yields
Pr{f(r)⊗ Re[n(r)]}(ξ) ≡
Pr{f(r1, ..., rn)⊗ Re[n(r1, ..., rn)]}(ξ)
= Pr
{ ∞∑
m1=−∞
...
∞∑
mn=−∞
c(m1, ...,mn)
× Re[n(r1 −m1, ..., rn −mn)]
}
(ξ)
= Pr{Re[n(r1, ..., rn)]} ⊗ Pr{Re[n(r1, ..., rn)]} ⊗ ...
∼ Gauss(ξ)
(10)
where Gauss(ξ) denotes a generic Gaussian distribution
which is obtained in the asymptotic limit as the number
of convolution of the same PDF tends to infinity [23].
Hence, we can expect the PDF of the Re[n(r) ⊗ f(r)]
to be normally distributed irrespective of the PDF of the
stochastic phase function Θ(k). Note that the above result
comes from the principal theme of the CLT, namely, that
when independent random variables are added, their sum
(assuming proper normalisation) tends toward a normal dis-
tribution even if the original variables themselves are not
normally distributed so that for independent real stochastic
functions n1(r), n2(r), ..., say,
Pr[n1(r) + n2(r) + ...](ξ) = Pr[n1(r)](ξ)⊗ Pr[n2(r)](ξ)⊗
... ∼ Gauss(ξ)
Although Equation (10) is predicated on a single real stochas-
tic function Re[n(r)] with a specific PDF, the δn-sequence
model for f(r) given by Equation (9) yields an infinite set of
shifted stochastic functions. In this context n1(r), n2(r), ...
are shifted versions of Re[n(r)].
In regard to the second term of Equation (6) given by
cn(r) ↔ c[exp[iΘ(k)]], Re[n(r)] is a composite sum of
independent random variables whose empirical distribution
is therefore, through application of the CLT, a normal distri-
bution [24]. Thus we may expect that
Pr{Re[n(r)]}(ξ) ∼ Gauss(ξ)
We can also expect that
Pr{Im[n(r)]}(ξ) ∼ Gauss(ξ)
and if we relax the condition on taking the real com-
ponent of n(r), then we obtain the complex PDF
Pr{Re[n(r)], Im[n(r)]}. Hence, given that both the real and
imaginary components are normally distributed, the joint
distribution in the complex plane will be given by a Rayleigh
distribution and we can therefore expect that
Pr{| n(r) |}(ξ) ∼ Rayleigh(ξ)
In summary, given Equation (6), we expect the PDFs
of the real (and imaginary) components of both terms on
the RHS of this equation to be normally distributed in the
asymptotic limit. Thus the signal Re[s(r)] can be expected
to be normally distributed and the PDF of the signal | s(r) |
to be Rayleigh distributed.
VI. CRYPTANALYSIS
We consider some approaches to breaking the cipher
s(r) in Equation (6). Two cases are considered, namely, a
Bayesian and a correlation attack.
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A. Bayesian based Cryptanalysis
It is well known that Bayesian analysis can be used to
generate a Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimate for f(r)
given Equation (2) where a Gaussian PDF for n(r) can be
applied, a statistical model that is relevent given the analysis
provided in Section V. In this case, the estimate for f(r), as
shown in Appendix A, is given by
f(r) = g∗(r) s(r) where g∗(r)↔ G∗(k) = N
∗(k)
| N(k) |2
and with N(k) = exp[iΘ(k)] it is clear that
G∗(k) = exp[−iΘ(k)]
This result rules out the ability to develop a Bayesian attack
because:
(i) the statistical signature of the ciphertext is dominated
by the (Gaussian distributed) function Re[n(r)] (pro-
viding c >> 1) and the statistical signature of the
plaintext f(r), after diffusion with n(r), is therefore
not available.
(ii) Even though the distribution of Re[n(r)] is Gaussian,
the stochastic phase function Θ(k) can be conditioned
to be uniformly distributed as discussed in Section VII
- see Equation (15). Thus, the homomorphic equation
lnF (k) = −iΘ(k) + lnS(k)
obtained by taking logarithms of the ML estimate
in Fourier space does not provide a solution that is
statistically significant when
∂
∂ξ
Pr[Θ(k)](ξ) = 0
B. Correlation based Cryptanalysis
Consider Equation (6). Given that s(r) is known, we can
construct the correlation function s∗(r)  s(r). In Fourier
space, this yields an equation for the power spectrum of the
ciphertext given by
| S(k) |2 =| F (k) exp[iΘ(k)] + c exp[iΘ(k)] |2
=| F (k) |2 +cF (k) + cF ∗(k) + c2
=| F (k) |2 +2cRe[F (k)] + c2
=| F (k) |2 +c2
[
1 +
2
c
Re[F (k)]
]
and hence, it is clear that
| S(k) |2=| F (k) |2 +c2, c→∞
or, using the correlation theorem,
s∗(r) s(r) = f∗(r) f(r) + c2δn(r); c→∞
and thus
s∗(r) s(r) = f∗(r) f(r); r > 0, c→∞
This result illustrates why it is important to apply a large
value of c (within the floating point accuracy available in
practice) to encrypt the information function f(r), thereby
eliminating the potential for an iterative attack based on
solving the quadratic equation
Re[F (k)]2 +Im[F (k)]2 +2cRe[F (k)]+ [c2− | S(k) |2] = 0
for Re[F(k)] when Im[F (k)] and c are undefined. Neverthe-
less, when c→∞, autocorrelating the ciphertext leads to a
decryption problem that is equivalent to the phase retrieval
problem, i.e. given that f(r)↔ F (k) =| F (k) | exp[iΦ(k)],
where Φ(k) is the phase function of the plaintext (not the
cipher), then if and only if | F (k) | is known, we are
required to estimate Φ(k), upon which f(r) can be obtained
by Fourier inversion.
In general, the phase retrieval problem is severely ill-posed
with no uniformly stable solutions in infinite-dimensional
spaces, a result that holds for frames that are continuous.
However, for r ∈ R2, phase estimation algorithms have been
developed to provide approximate solutions to this problem,
especially in regard to X-ray crystallography, for example,
where the magnitude only diffraction pattern in the far-field
is determined by the two-dimensional Fourier transform of
the diffractor, i.e. the crystal, [2]. In this context, correlation
of the ciphertext could lead to a phase retrieval based attack
using algorithms described in [28] and [29], for example.
However, there is a simple solution to preventing such an
attack which is to replace the Spectral Embedding Coefficient
c with cΘ(k) thereby weighting the phase-only spectrum
with the phase function. This is because in Fourier space,
Equation (6) can be modified to
S(k) = F (k) exp[iΘ(k)] + cΘ(k) exp[i(Θ(k)] (11)
when F (k) is now given by
F (k) = exp[−iΘ(k)]S(k)− cΘ(k) (12)
and, via the correlation theorem
f(r) = n∗(r) s(r)− cθ(r)
where θ(r) = F−1n [Θ(k)]. The power spectrum of the
ciphertext is then given by (noting the Θ(k) is a real
function)
| S(k) |2=| F (k) |2 +c2Θ2(k), c→∞ (13)
with application of the correlation and convolution theorems
yielding the equation
s∗(r) s(r) = f∗(r) f(r) + c2θ(r)⊗ θ(r)
It is then clear that the phase retrieval problem can not
be attempted with out access to knowledge of the cipher
Θ(k), i.e. the same cipher that is used to phase-only en-
crypt the plaintext. We call this solution ‘Weighted Phase-
only Encryption’ (WPOE). In principle, a secondary pseudo
random number generating algorithm can be used so that
Equations (11) and (12) are replaced with
S(k) = F (k) exp[iΘ1(k)] + cΘ2(k) exp[i(Θ1(k)]
and
F (k) = exp[−iΘ1(k)]S(k)− cΘ2(k) (14)
respectively, where Θ1(k) and Θ2(k) are independent ci-
phers generated by the same algorithm with different keys
or two different algorithms with the same or different keys.
A secondary algorithm/key is then required to decrypt the
ciphertext using Equation (14) in order to secure against
an attack through analysis of ciphertext correlation and the
implementation of a phase retrieval algorithm.
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In the following section, algorithms are developed that
provide a user with two options:
Option (1): Phase-only Encryption (POE) - encryption
based on Equation (7) where decryption is not dependent
on knowledge of c only knowledge of the key(s) used to
compute Θ(k).
Option (2): Weighted Phase-only Encryption (WPOE)
- encryption based on Equation (11) where decryption is
dependent on knowledge of c as well as knowledge of the
key(s).
VII. PHASE-ONLY ENCRYPTION/DECRYPTION
ALGORITHMS
Although the terms Re[p(r) ⊗ f(r)] and Re[n(r)] from
Equation (6) can be expected to have non-uniform distribu-
tions (as discussed in Section V and as illustrated in Figures 1
and 2 of Section VIII), the stochastic phase function Θ(k) is
assumed to be, or, at least can be conditioned to be uniformly
distributed and wrapped between −pi and pi radians, i.e.
Pr[Θ(k)](ξ) = U(ξ), ξ ∈ [−pi, pi] (15)
where
U(ξ) =
{
1
2pi , ∀ξ ∈ [−pi, pi];
0, ∀ξ /∈ [−pi, pi].
There are two principal ways to compute the random phase
function Θ(k) ∈ [−pi, pi] ∀k:
(i) Generate a normalised uniformly distributed function
R(k) ∈ [0, 1], say, and let
Θ(k) = 2pi
[
R(k)− 1
2
]
(16)
(ii) Construct Θ(k) via Fourier transformation of a random
variable denoted by r(r) ∈ [0, 1] say, i.e.
Θ(k) = atan2[R(k)], R(k) = Fn[r(r)] (17)
where atan2 yields the 4-quadrant phase values in the
range [−pi, pi] by computing one unique arc tangent
value in which the signs of both arguments are used to
determine the quadrant of the result, thereby selecting
the desired branch of the arc tangent. Since r(r) is real
and has no symmetry, R(k) has a symmetric real com-
ponent and an asymmetric imaginary component. The
4-quadrant phase function is therefore an asymmetric
function, i.e. Θ(k) = −Θ(−k), and has a symmetric
uniform PDF. In this context, the stochastic signature
of Θ(k) in one half-space is repeated in the other. The
two half-spaces are therefore correlated.
One of the principal differences between the two ap-
proaches for computing the phase function given above
is that application of Equation (16) requires the complex
ciphertext to be used in order to recover the plaintext,
whereas Equation (17) requires only the real component
of the ciphertext to be retained thereby halving the data
storage/transmission requirements needed to recover the
plaintext albeit at the ‘price’ of using a stochastic phase
function with the property Θ(k) = −Θ(−k). For this reason,
in the following sections, Equation (17) is used, the principal
steps associated with the two algorithms being presented for
r ∈ R1 without considering any data or data processing
error checks. In the following step-by-step algorithms, the
two options quantified at the end of Section VI are given in
‘Step 4’, the notation used being chosen to reflect that of
the preceding mathematical analysis for the case of a one-
dimensional discrete array.
A. Phase-only Encryption Algorithm
Inputs: Plaintext array fn (floating point reals) of size N
(integer) read from a plaintext file; real constants key > 0
(integer), c > 0 (floating point); opt (integer) - opt = 0
provides POE, opt 6= 0 provides WPOE.
Data processing functions: Algol - algorithm for
generating an array of (real) random numbers for a known
key key; Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) via application
of a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) algorithm.
Step 1: For an input data stream fn, n = 1, 2, .., N ,
compute a uniformly distributed random variable array
rn ∈ [0, 1], n = 1, 2, ..., N using a known algorithm
Algol(key) seeded by a known key key.
Step 2: Compute the discrete (complex) spectrum Rn
of rn using a DFT.
Step 3: Compute the phase-only spectrum exp(iΘn)
by returning the 4-quadrant phase angles Θn ∈ [−pi, pi] of
Rn.
Step 4:
(i) For opt = 0, compute the array
Sn = Fnexp(iΘn) + c exp(iΘn)
(ii) For opt 6= 0, compute the array
Sn = Fnexp(iΘn) + cΘn exp(iΘn)
Step 5: Compute the inverse DFT of Sn, returning Re[sn].
Output: Ciphertext array sn (floating point reals) of
size N (integer) written to a ciphertext file.
Remark VII.1. Note that the value of c is limited by
the floating point accuracy used. Within the floating point
precision applied, if the value of c becomes excessive, then
floating point truncation of the array Fnexp(iΘn) relative to
c exp(iΘn) or cΘn exp(iΘn) will occur, and thus, decryption
of the array sn (as given in the following algorithm) becomes
subject to floating point error. For c = 10n, a floating point
precision of at least n decimal places is required.
B. Phase-only Decryption Algorithm
Data inputs: Ciphertext array sn (floating point reals) of
size N (integer) read from a ciphertext file, real constant
key > 0 (integer), c > 0 (floating point), opt (integer)
- opt = 0 provides Phase-only Decryption (POD) when
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knowledge of c used for POE is not required, opt 6= 0
provides Weighted Phase-only Decryption (WPOD) when
knowledge of c used for WPOE is required.
Data processing functions: Algol - outputs an array
of (real) random numbers for an identical key key to that
used for encryption; Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) via
application of a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT).
Step 1: For the input ciphertext array sn, n = 1, 2, .., N
(taken to be composed on N reals), compute random variable
array rn ∈ [0.1], n = 1, 2, ..., N using an known algorithm
Algol(key) seeded by key key - same algorithm/key used
to generate the ciphertext sn.
Step 2: Compute the discrete (complex) spectrum Rn
of rn using the DFT.
Step 3: Compute the phase-only spectrum exp(iΘn)
by returning the phase angles Θn ∈ [−pi, pi] of Rn.
Step 4:
(i) For opt = 0, compute the array
Fn = Snexp(−iΘn)
(ii) For opt 6= 0, compute the array
Fn = Snexp(−iΘn)− cΘn exp(−iΘn)
Step 5: Compute the inverse DFT of Fn and return the real
components fn setting f1 = 0 for opt = 0 - re-normalising
condition as specified in Equation (5).
Output: Plaintext array fn (floating point reals) of
size N (integer) written to a plaintext file.
Remark VII.2. It is assumed that the key(s) are subject to
the usual conditions associated with high strength cryptog-
raphy in terms of key length and have binary representations
that exhibit bit streams with a Binary Entropy Function ' 1.
Remark VII.3. Algol(key) is assumed to be a crypto-
graphically strong random number generating algorithm in
terms of generating randomness with a uniform distribution,
a uniform power spectral density function, a high Lyapunov
exponent and high cycle length, for example. In this context,
Algol(key) should be personalised using an algorithm ob-
tained through the application of Evolutionary Computing,
e.g. [9], [25] and [17].
Remark VII.4. Although the algorithms given above are
specific for a vector array, the principle is identical for
processing multi-dimensional arrays. Prototype software de-
signed for the case when r ∈ R2 is considered in the
following section.
VIII. MATLAB PROTOTYPE CODE FOR r ∈ R2
Appendix B provides prototype software using MAT-
LAB to implement the algorithms given in Sections VII.A
and VII.B but for two-dimensional array processing us-
ing the phase-only encryption function POE(key R,key G,
key B,c,opt) and the phase-only decryption function
POD(key R,key G, key B,c,opt) for a full colour RGB image
(assumed to be a bitmap file - ‘Plaintext.bmp’). Each RGB
(8-bit) component of the input image is encrypted separately
using an individual colour component key (i.e. key R, key G
and key B). The output for each colour component is written
to a separate .txt file as a floating point matrix using the
MATLAB function dlmwrite with a specified precision. The
value of c is specified as an input to both the encryption
and decryption functions. However, for opt = 0, the value
of c used to decrypt is not required and c can be set to
a dummy value (typically set c = 1) for the purpose of
executing function POD in this case.
Both the encryption and decryption algorithms given in
Appendix B rely on the use of the same uniformly distributed
random number generator (MATLAB function rand) which
is based on the Mersenne Twister algorithm, returning a
uniformly distributed floating point number stream in the
range 0-1 inclusively. However, this generator is used for
illustrative purpose only, and, in practice, would be replaced
with a cryptographically stronger algorithm as discussed in
Remark VII.3. Each RGB component array is re-normalised
separately after decryption according to Equation (5).
In terms of a conventional cryptographic protocol, the
functions provided in Appendix B represent a floating point
based symmetric encryption system in which Alice encrypts
an image using three keys and transmits three files to Bob
- typically in a zipped folder. Upon reception of these files,
Bob uses the same keys to decrypt the data held in the three
files. As with all other symmetric encryption schemes, this
requires a key exchange protocol to be implemented such
as the Diffie-Hellman [26] key exchange algorithm, or, as
discussed in Section IX, the use of a phase-only approach for
implementing a three-pass protocol. It is noted that the three
keys plus three files ‘solution’ considered can be reduced
to a single key plus single file protocol by concatenation.
However, the three keys, three files solution provided can be
used to yield a further level of security using ‘time stamping’.
A. Test Case
Figure 1 shows an example of an input colour test image
(input to function POE) and the (colour) decrypt (output of
function POD) using RGB component keys, each composed
of randomly generated integers consisting of a maximum of
10 digits (the limiting upper bound for a MATLAB random
number generator with a non-negative integer seed < 232)
for c = 1010 and opt = 0 so that the term c exp[iΘ(k)] in
Equation (7) is ten orders of magnitude larger than the first
term of the same equation. The RGB concatenated cipher-
text is also displayed together with the normalised 256-bin
histogram of the ciphertext obtained by taking the mean of
the histograms for each re-normalised colour component (the
‘RGB averaged’ histogram) and setting the first component
of the histogram to zero in order to eradicate the dominance
of the ‘black bin’. Figure 2 shows a similar example but for a
different colour image encrypted for the case when c = 1010
and opt = 1 thereby implementing WPOE compounded in
Equations (11) and (12).
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Fig. 1. Example application of the MATLAB functions given in Appendix
B: plaintext (top-left), ciphertext (top-right), decrypt (bottom-left) and the
normalised 256-bin RGB averaged histogram of the ciphertext (bottom-
right) for c = 0 and opt = 0.
Fig. 2. Example application using the MATLAB functions given in
Appendix B: plaintext (top-left), ciphertext (top-right), decrypt (bottom-
left) and the normalised 256-bin RGB averaged histogram of the ciphertext
(bottom-right) for c = 1010 and opt = 1.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrates the difference in the dis-
tributions of the ciphertext between POE and WPOE. In
the former case, the normalised histogram has a relatively
uniform distribution over the central region and has relatively
short tails compared to a standard normal distribution which
is the statistical signature of the ciphertext for WPOE.
This is due to the use of a uniformly distributed random
number generator used to construct the phase function via
Equation (17).
B. Numerical Analysis
The decrypt has a high fidelity with a Root Mean Square
Error (RMSE) averaged over the RGB components of the
order of 10−4, the RMSE being defined as
RMSE =
1
3
(ER + EG + EB) (18)
where, for each colour component R,G and B,
E =
1
NM
‖Pnm −Dnm‖2
Here, Pnm denotes the plaintext (input) image, Dnm denotes
the decrypt (output) image (each array being composed of
N ×M pixels) and ‖ • ‖2 denotes the Frobenius norm, i.e.
for a two-dimensional array anm
‖anm‖2 =
(
N∑
n=1
M∑
m=1
| anm |2
) 1
2
However, as briefly discussed in Remark III.1, the accuracy
of the decrypt (i.e. the value of the RMSE for a specific value
of c) depends on the floating point precision that is applied,
the operation of the algorithms provided in Appendix B being
set to a default precision value of 32-bits, the MATLAB
(2018a) default being 64 bits. This effect is quantified in
Figure 3 which shows the log-log plots of the RMSE against
values of the Spectral Embedding Coefficient c ∈ [1, 1015]
for precisions of 4, 8 and 16 bits associated with the
execution of function POE with opt = 0 (for the plaintext
image given in Figure 1). This is achieved by changing
the precision in the dlmwrite functions used at the end of
function POE in Appendix B. The results given in Figure 3
illustrate the effect of decreasing the floating point precision.
As the precision decreases, so does the maximum value of
cdB given by Equation (8) that can be applied. In each case,
the RMSE remains constant until a threshold is reached, after
which the RMSE increases linearly, the threshold decreasing
with the precision applied.
Although the results given in Figure 3 have been obtained
for the plaintext image given in Figure 1, they are indicative
of all full colour image inputs, irrespective of size and
format. The results show the numerical limits for which
Theorem III.1 is operational in relation to the floating point
accuracy under which the algorithms given in Appendix B
are executed. It is therefore to be expected that as the floating
point precision decreases so will the maximum value of cdB
that can be applied. By way of an example, for a precision
of 8 bits, from Figure 3 (dotted line), it is clear that the
largest value of log10c that can be applied before the RMSE
starts to increase is the order of 6. Thus, from Equation (8),
max[cdB] ∼ 60 dB or equivalently, min[(1 + R)dB] ∼
−60 dB (where (1+R)dB = 10 log10(1+R) = −10 log10 c
- see Corollary III.2) which is an exceptionally low mini-
mum Signal-to-Noise Ratio subject to generating a decrypt
which such high fidelity. Similarly, from Figure 3, for 16-bit
precision the minimum SNR that can be applied is the order
of −130 dB. These results are similar for the case when
WPOE is applied (i.e. for opt 6= 0). However, this is specific
to the plaintext image used in Figure 1 and for images of
a different type (including format and size, for example) it
should be expected that the results given in Figure 3 will
change in scale but exhibit the same basic characteristics.
IX. APPLICATIONS TO KEY EXCHANGE USING A
THREE-PASS PROTOCOL
The Three-Pass Protocol (TPP) is well known and a range
of algorithms have been developed for its implementation.
These include the Shamir TPP [30] and the Massey-Omura
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Fig. 3. Log-log (base 10) plots of the RMSE for values of the Spectral
Embedding Coefficient c associated with the application of the functions
given in Appendix B with bit precisions of 16 (solid line), 8 (dotted line)
and 4 (dashed line) bits.
method [31]. The principle associated with the protocol
is as follows: Alice encrypts her plaintext with a known
algorithm and private key KA say, and sends the ciphertext
to Bob. Upon receipt of the ciphertext, Bob cannot decrypt
the ciphertext because he does not know KA. Instead Bob
encrypts the ciphertext using the same algorithm and a new
private key KB and sends the now double encrypted plaintext
back to Alice. Upon receipt, and critically, assuming the
encryption algorithm is commutative, Alice can decrypt the
double encrypted ciphertext with KA and send the result (a
single encrypted ciphertext) back to Bob who is then able to
decrypt the result using KB . By using this protocol, Alice
and Bob do not need to agree upon KA and KB a priori and
thus, no separate key exchange method is required. Three
principal conditions for the application of this protocol are
required:
• Irrespective of the number of encryptions that take
place, the encryption algorithm used must be both
commutative and strong enough so that it can not be
broken using a known algorithm attack;
• the keys used must be of a sufficient length to make an
exhaustive attack impracticable on any pass;
• if the encrypted information is intercepted for each of
the three passes, it must not be possible to determine
the plaintext from the three intercepts (assumed to be
complete intercepts in each case).
In practice, it is the third of the conditions above that
yields the greatest vulnerability and any encryption system
that exploits this protocol must be based on algorithms that
exhibit a ‘computational difficulty’. For example, in the case
of the Shamir and Massey-Omura algorithms, the security
relies on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms in
a finite field [32]. In this section we consider an application
of the three-pass protocol using a phase-only encryption
(commutative) algorithm.
A. Basic Algorithm
Consider the classic TPP in which Alice wishes to
exchange a single key given by the function f(r) ↔ F (k)
where f(r) is taken to be a real function, the value of
the key for f(r = 0) being taken to be redundant (re-
normalisation condition). Alice generates the random phase
cipher Θ1(k) and similarly, Bob generates Θ2(k) where
both Θ1(k) and Θ2(k) are generated via application of the
Fourier transform, i.e. exp[iΘj(k)] ↔ nj(r), j = 1, 2, the
algorithm(s) for generating the ciphers nj(r) being taken to
be cryptographically strong and ideally personal to Alice
and Bob through application of an evolutionary computing
approach [9]. The following steps are then applied.
Step 1: For a given value of c >> 1, known only to
Alice, she encrypts F (k) to produce ciphertext S1(k) using
the equation
S1(k) = F (k) exp[iΘ1(k)] + c exp[iΘ1(k)] (19)
and sends Re[s1(r)] of s1(r)↔ S1(k) to Bob.
Step 2: Upon receiving the ciphertext S1(k) ↔ Re[s1(r)],
Bob encrypts S1(k) using the equation
S2(k) = S1(k) exp[iΘ2(k)] (20)
and sends Re[s2(r)] of s2(r)↔ S2(k) back to Alice.
Step 3: Alice decrypts Bobs ciphertext S2(k) ↔ Re[s1(r)]
using the equation
S3(k) = S2(k) exp[−iΘ1(k)]
= S1(k) exp[iΘ2(k)] exp[−iΘ1(k)]
= [F (k) + c] exp[iΘ1(k)] exp[−iΘ1(k)] exp[iΘ2(k)]
= [F (k) + c] exp[iΘ2(k)]
(21)
and sends Re[s3(r)] of s3(r)↔ S3(k) back to Bob.
Step 4: Bob decrypts the ciphertext S3(k) ↔ Re[s3(r)]
using the equation
F (k) + c = S3(k) exp[−iΘ2(k)] (22)
The key is then given by Re[f(r)] r > 0 where f(r)↔ F (k)
given that Re[f(0)] is undefined, or, with application of the
re-normalisation condition Re[f(0)] = 0.
B. Three-intercept Cryptanalysis
Assume that an attack is launched to estimate f(r) based
on knowledge of the TPP used (i.e. Steps 1-4 as given
in Section IX.A) and knowledge of the functions S1(k),
S2(k) and S3(k) obtained by intercepting the transmission
associated with Steps 1-3 (and taking the Fourier transform
of the results). Given Equations (19) - (22), we can eliminate
the ciphers Θ1 and Θ2 to obtain the equation
F (k) + c =
S1(k)S3(k)
S2(k)
=
S1(k)S
∗
2 (k)S3(k)
| S2(k) |2
or, from Equations (20),
F (k) + c =
S1(k)S
∗
2 (k)S3(k)
| S1(k) |2
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Further, given that the Spectral Embedding Coefficient c is
taken to be set to high orders of magnitude (within the
floating point precision available as discussed in Section
VIII.B) then, from Equation (19), for the asymptotic case
when c→∞
F (k) + c =
S1(k)S
∗
2 (k)S3(k)
| F (k) |2 +c2
and it is clear that to obtain F (k) we are required to solve
the cubic equation
| F (k) |2 F (k) + c | F (k) |2 +c2F (k) + c3
= S1(k)S
∗
2 (k)S3(k)
(23)
for an unknown value of c → ∞. Thus, the ‘improbability’
of ‘breaking the key’ lies in solving Equation (23) which
can be written in terms of its constituent real and imaginary
component via the following equations:
F 3r (k) + F
2(k)Fi(k) + c[F
2
r (k) + F
2
i (k)] + c
2Fr(k) + c
3
= Re[S1(k)S
∗
2 (k)S3(k)]
and
F 3i (k) + FiF
2
r (k) + c
2Fi(k) = Im[S1(k)S
∗
2 (k)S3(k)]
where Fr(k) and Fi(k) are the real and imaginary com-
ponents of the complex spectrum F (k), respectively. It is
then clear that we have two equations with three unknowns,
i.e. Fr(k), Fi(k), and the real constant c (which is known
only to Alice, being required for the first pass only). The
equations therefore represent an under-determined system,
and, in this context have infinitely many complex solutions
(i.e. solutions in an algebraically closed field) or solutions
that are inconsistent.
C. MATLAB Prototype Code for r ∈ R1
Appendix C provides prototype software using MATLAB
to implement the algorithm given in Section IX.A for one-
dimensional array processing using function TPP(key,step,c).
This function, where TPP is an acronym for Three-Pass
Protocol, has been designed to transfer an array of integers
between two users (Alice and Bob, say) in the form of an
ASCII delimited file which represents the initial plaintext -
Plaintext.txt. The plaintext is typically a key which may be a
concatenation of the keys used to execute the functions POE
and POD given in Appendix B, for example. The function
has three inputs:
• the key - a string of numbers between 0 and 9 - used by
Alice for the first and third passes and a different key
used by Bob for the second pass and the final decrypt;
• the step which has input values 1 (first pass), 2 (second
pass), 3 (third pass) and 4 (for the final decrypt);
• the Spectral Embedding Constant c which is required for
the first pass (for step=1) only, i.e. c >> 1 is required
to be set by Alice to produce the first ciphertext; the
value of this constant is not required to be known by
Bob and is not used for any step other than step 1.
In each of the steps 1-3, the ciphertext is written to a file
- ‘Ciphertext.txt’ - which is assumed to be sent (by email,
for example) from Alice to Bob (step=1), from Bob back to
Alice (step=2) and from Alice back to Bob (step=3). After
step=3, Bob decrypts the ciphertext to recover the plaintext
file which is output to the file ‘Plaintext.txt’. In all cases, the
MATLAB functions ‘dmlread’ and ‘dmlwrite’ are used for
reading and writing the data to and from file, respectively.
By way of an example, and, in context of the operation of
function TPP given in Appendix C, consider the exchange
of a key given by the array 80 97 115 115 119 111 114 100
which is the ASCII decimal integer representation for the
character string Password. It is assumed that Alice creates a
file called ‘Plaintext.txt’ containing the integers given. Alice
runs the function (for opt = 1) TPP(1234,1,123456789)
where 1234 is Alice’s key (known only to her), setting the
value of c to 123456789 (also known only to Alice). Note
that any value of c can be used by Alice up to the threshold
associated with the precision available which needs to be
quantified as in Figure 3; the precision is set to 32-bits in
function TPP. After receipt of the file ‘Ciphertext.txt’ from
Alice, Bob runs the function (for opt = 2) TPP(4321,2)
where 4321 is Bob’s key (known only to him) and sends
the result - ‘Ciphertext.txt’ - back to Alice. After receipt of
Bob’s cipher, Alice runs the function TPP(1234,3) and sends
the new ciphertext file - ‘Ciphertext.txt’ - back to Bob. Upon
receipt of this file, Bob runs TPP(4321,4) to recover the key
which is written in the output file ‘Plaintext.txt’. Providing
identical private keys are used by Alice and Bob for steps
1 and 3 and steps 2 and 4, respectively, the output file will
contain the integer array 80 97 115 115 119 111 114 100.
Thus Alice’s key is passed to Bob using a TPP.
In step 1 of the function TPP, the input is zero padded,
a zero being added to the first element of array. The reason
for this is due to the re-normalisation condition which is
applied in step 4 of the same function when the first element
of the decrypt is eliminated from the output. In this way, re-
normalisation becomes an intrinsic part of the process and is
independent of the input and output plaintext’s sent by Alice
and received by Bob, respectively.
Given that the algorithms presented in Appendix B require
three keys (for the Red, Green and Blue components),
function TPP can be used to exchange these keys using a
concatenated key
key R ‖ key G ‖ key B
where it is noted that this concatenation is for an array of
integers not a string of numbers. The components of the
array associated with each key are then concatenated into
a string for application in functions POE and POD, the
length of the integer strings representing each component key
being limited to 10 digits (the limiting upper bound for the
MATLAB random number generator used in these function).
This approach can be extended to include an exchange of the
Spectral Embedding Constant c when the option to apply
WPOE is used in functions POE and POD. Alternatively
the value of c may be exchanged separately using a second
application of function TPP. Further, it is noted that function
TPP can of course be used to pass any plaintext which is
input as an ASCII decimal integer stream as given in the
example above.
It is apparent that the implementation of phase-only en-
cryption for a TPP key exchange may be subject to an
attack through application of a phase retrieval algorithms
as considered in Section VI.B. However, the practicality
of implementing phase retrieval algorithms is dimension
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dependent. It is well known that for r ∈ R2, the phase
retrieval problem has a range of solutions based on iterative
numerical methods as briefly discussed and referenced in
Section VI.B. However, for r ∈ R1, the phase retrieval
problem is ambiguousness, the determination of the phase
within the extensive solution set being challenging and only
able to be considered under suitable a priori assumptions or
additional information. Thus an attack through application
of a one-dimensional phase retrieval algorithm on any one
of the passes (in particular, Steps 2 and 3 given in Section
IX.A) can, at least for now, be assumed to be irrelevant.
This statement should be appreciated within the context
of possible future solutions to the one-dimensional phase
retrieval problem. For example, it has recently been shown
that a signal can be uniquely recovered from the Fourier
amplitude alone if interference measurements between the
unknown signal and a reference signal (unrelated to the
unknown signal) are available [33], the investigation of this
approach with regard to Section IX.B lying beyond the scope
of this work. However, until one-dimensional phase retrieval
solutions become as readily applicable and tractable as those
developed for the two-dimensional case, the application of
phase-only encryption for r ∈ R1 and the key exchange so-
lution compounded in function TPP will remain a significant
challenge for cryptanalysts. In this sense, it is arguable that
plaintext’s in general should be transferred using variations
on a theme of function TPP (to include generic data I/O,
for example), including digital images, rather than using the
function to exchange only the keys used for execution of the
functions given in Appendix B, especially when conditioned
according to the principles discussed in Section II.E.
X. SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT AND USAGE
Appendix B and Appendix C are provided to give readers
access to source code that implements the algorithms dis-
cussed in this paper using m-code. In both cases, copyright
is attributed to J. M. Blackledge et al. and all rights are
reserved. Redistribution and use in source and binary forms,
with or without modification, are permitted provided that the
following conditions are met:
• Redistributions of source code must retain the above
copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
disclaimer.
• Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials
provided with the distribution.
• Neither the name of the organisation nor the names of
its contributors may be used to endorse or promote
products derived from this software without specific
prior written permission.
The software listed in Appendices B and C is provided
by the copyright holders and contributors as is and any
express or implied warranties, including, but not limited to,
the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for
a particular purpose are disclaimed. In no event shall the
copyright holders be liable for any direct, indirect, incidental,
special, exemplary, or consequential damages (including, but
not limited to, procurement of substitute goods or services;
loss of use, data, or profits; or business interruption) however
caused and on any theory of liability, whether in contract,
strict liability, or tort (including negligence or otherwise)
arising in any way out of the use of this software, even if
advised of the possibility of such damage.
XI. CONCLUSION
The material presented in this paper is predicated on
proving the result that if the noise function associated with
Equation (4) is considered to have a phase-only spectrum,
then an exact and unique solution is available given by
Equation (5). Further, if the phase function is taken to be
a known stochastic function, then this result can be used
to develop a phase-only encryption scheme as discussed in
Section VII. The phase function can be generating using
Equation (16) when the ciphertext is taken to be complex or
Equation (17) when only the real component of the ciphertext
is required. In this paper, the latter case has been considered.
As discussed in Section VI.B, in principle, an attack can
be launched based on the application of a (two-dimensional)
phase retrieval algorithm such as those used for X-ray
crystallography. Thus to use such an encryption method in
the field, the approach requires:
(i) application of a unique and cryptographically strong
encryption algorithm(s) as discussed in Remark VII.3;
(ii) application of the same or a secondary cipher to
prevent a correlation-based attack as compounded in
Equation (13).
The theoretical foundations of phase-only deconvolution
has, in this paper, been developed for n-dimensions. Thus
the approach can be extended, without loss of generality, for
n-dimensional data encryption. However, a MATLAB based
application has been developed for the two-dimensional case,
and, in particular for full colour images as discussed in
Section VIII. It is noted that each colour component used in
the algorithms provided in Appendix B can be replaced by
an independent grey level or binary input (plaintext) image.
The algorithms given rely on the encryption/decryption keys
being known a priori and in this sense represent a standard
symmetric encryption scheme. For this reason, the applica-
tion of phase-only encryption to the key exchange problem
has been considered as detailed in Section IX in which a
three-pass protocol has been used. The algorithm presented
in Appendix C can be used to exchange the keys required
for implementation of algorithms given in Appendix B or can
be used independently to exchange any plaintext composed
of an array of integer numbers (assumed to be the decimal
integers associated with the ASCII 7-bit code). Finally, it is
noted that this approach can be ‘coupled’ with the method
of information hiding developed by Blackledge et al [34] in
which the functions POE and POD are used to transfer a
covertext image.
APPENDIX A
BAYESIAN CRYPTANALYSIS OF EQUATION (4)
Given Equation (4), using Bayes theorem, an estimate for
the plaintext f(r) can be considered subject to the condition
[1]
∂
∂f
ln Pr(s | f) + ∂
∂f
ln Pr(f) = 0 (24)
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where Pr(s | f) denotes the a posteriori PDF of ‘s given f ’
and Pr(f) is the PDF of of the plaintext f . Clearly, in order
to use this conditioning equation, models for the PDF’s of n
and f are required.
Suppose we consider f(r) to be uniformly distributed and
n(r) to be Gaussian distributed. Then,
∂
∂f
ln Pr(f) = 0
The a posteriori PDF Pr(s | f) is determined by the PDF
of the cipher Pr(n) and from equation (4)
n(r) = s(r)− n(r)⊗ f(r)
so that
Pr(s | f) =
1√
2piσ2n
exp
(
− 1
2σ2n
∫
dnr | s(r)− n(r)⊗ f(r) |2
)
where σn is the standard deviation of Pr(n). We are then
required to solve for f(r) subject to the condition
∂
∂f
ln Pr(s | f) = 0
Differentiating, application of the orthogonality principle [1]
yields the equation
[s(r)− n(r)⊗ f(r)] n∗(r) = 0
In Fourier space (through application the convolution and
correlation theorems) we have
S(k)N∗(k) =| N(k) |2 F (k)
and hence, the Bayesian estimate for the Fourier transform
of the plaintext is given by
F (k) =
S(k)N∗(k)
| N(k) |2
APPENDIX B
PROTOTYPE MATLAB FUNCTIONS FOR PHASE-ONLY
ENCRYPTION/DECRYPTION OF FULL COLOUR IMAGE
The functions given in this Appendix have not been ex-
haustively tested and are provided to give the reader a guide
to the basic software engineering required to implement
the computational procedures discussed in Section VII.A
and VII.B, and, in turn, to help the reader appreciate the
theoretical model developed in this paper. Where possible,
the notation used for array variables and constants are based
on the mathematical notation used in this paper. Note that
the m-code given has been condensed spatially in order to
conform to the format of this publication while minimising
the number of pages required to present it. The software
was developed and implemented using (64-bit) MATLAB
R2018b.
A. Function to Phase-Only Encrypt a Colour Image
function []=POE(key_R,key_G,key_B,c,opt)
%FUNCTION: Phase-only Encryption (POE)
% of a full colour image
%INPUTS:
%Plaintext colour image (Plaintext.bmp)
%Key_R: Key for Red component cipher;
%Key_G: Key for Green component cipher;
%Key_B: Key for Blue component cipher;
%c: Spectral Embedding Coefficient;
%OPTIONS:
%if opt==0, POE method is applied.
%if opt not==0, WPOE method is applied.
%OUTPUTS:
%Three .txt files of ciphertexts
%for RGB components.
%Read plaintext colour image (assumed
%to be a .bmp file) and show input image
%in figure using function ’imshow’ (as
%required by the user).
I_C=imread(’Plaintext.bmp’);
figure(1), imshow(I_C);
%Extract RGB components of the input
%colour image, evaluate image size and
%convert RGB arrays to floating point
%form (double) - arrays taken to have
%N rows and M columns.
I_R =I_C(:, :, 1); I_G =I_C(:, :, 2);
I_B =I_C(:, :, 3); [N,M]=size(I_R);
I_R=im2double(I_R); I_G=im2double(I_G);
I_B=im2double(I_B);
%Compute the following:
%(i) Uniformly distributed phase arrays
%for each RGB component using the input
%keys and MATLAB function ’rand’.
rng(key_R,’twister’); Theta_R=rand(N,M);
rng(key_G,’twister’); Theta_G=rand(N,M);
rng(key_B,’twister’); Theta_B=rand(N,M);
%(ii) The two-dimensional DFT of each
%array using function ’fft2’, the phase
%angles (inverse tangent in radians
%between -pi and +pi) associated with
%the real and imaginary components of
%spectrum using function ’angle’ and
%the phase-only spectra N_R, N_G & N_B.
N_R=exp(i*angle(fft2(Theta_R)));
N_G=exp(i*angle(fft2(Theta_G)));
N_B=exp(i*angle(fft2(Theta_B)));
%Encrypt input RGB components using phase
%only ciphers generated above by taking
%the DFT of the colour components, adding
%the results to the phase only cipher
%scaled by the embedding coefficient c
%(for opt==0) and take the real component
%of the inverse DFT (using the function
%’ifft2’), else, apply the WPOE method.
if opt==0
I_R=real(ifft2((fft2(I_R).*N_R)+c*N_R));
I_G=real(ifft2((fft2(I_G).*N_G)+c*N_G));
I_B=real(ifft2((fft2(I_B).*N_B)+c*N_B));
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else
I_R=real(ifft2((fft2(I_R).*N_R) ...
+c*Theta_R.*N_R));
I_G=real(ifft2((fft2(I_G).*N_G) ...
+c*Theta_G.*N_G));
I_B=real(ifft2((fft2(I_B).*N_B) ...
+c*Theta_B.*N_B));
end
%Output the RGB components of the
%ciphertext (as floating point
%matrices with a precision set to
%32-bits) to three separate .txt files
dlmwrite(’R_Enc.txt’,I_R, ...
’delimiter’,’ ’, ’precision’,32);
dlmwrite(’G_Enc.txt’,I_G, ...
’delimiter’,’ ’, ’precision’,32);
dlmwrite(’B_Enc.txt’,I_B, ...
’delimiter’,’ ’, ’precision’,32);
%Concatenate the RGB component of the
%ciphertext and show normalised output
%ciphertext image in figure 2 using
%’imshow’ (as required by user).
I_R=I_R./max(max(abs(I_R)));
I_G=I_G./max(max(abs(I_G)));
I_B=I_B./max(max(abs(I_B)));
I_C = cat(3,I_R,I_G,I_B);
figure(2), imshow(I_C);
B. Function to Phase-Only Decrypt a Colour Image
function []=POD(key_R,key_G,key_B,c,opt)
%FUNCTION: Phase-only Decryption (POD)
% of a full colour image.
%INPUTS:
%Key_R: Key for Red component cipher;
%Key_G: Key for Green component cipher;
%Key_B: Key for Blue component cipher;
%c: Spectral Embedding Coefficient;
%OPTIONS:
%opt==0 POE method is applied
%opt not==0 WPOE method is applied.
%Note: if opt==0, the embedding
%coefficient is not used for
%decryption and any ’dummy value’
%may be passed (e.g. c=0), else, the
%value of c used to encrypt the image
%must be passed to obtain a decrypt.
%OUTPUT:
%Decrypt colour image (.bmp format).
%Read ciphertext of each RGB encrypted
%component from associated .txt files
%and compute array size
I_R=dlmread(’R_Enc.txt’);
I_G=dlmread(’G_Enc.txt’);
I_B=dlmread(’B_Enc.txt’);
[N,M]=size(I_R);
%Normalise RGB ciphertext components
%to recover colour ciphertext image I_C
%and display the result (as required).
I_R_N=I_R./max(max(abs(I_R)));
I_G_N=I_G./max(max(abs(I_G)));
I_B_N=I_B./max(max(abs(I_B)));
I_C = cat(3,I_R_N,I_G_N,I_B_N);
figure(1), imshow(I_C);
%Re-generate ciphers and phase only
%spectrum used to encrypt RGB
%components of the plaintext image
%using function POE.
rng(key_R,’twister’); Theta_R=rand(N,M);
N_R=exp(i*angle(fft2(Theta_R)));
rng(key_G,’twister’); Theta_G=rand(N,M);
N_G=exp(i*angle(fft2(Theta_G)));
rng(key_B,’twister’); Theta_B=rand(N,M);
N_B=exp(i*angle(fft2(Theta_B)));
%Decrypt the RGB components in Fourier
%space, apply inverse DFT (using ’ifft2’),
%take the real components output with
%undefined components being set to zero.
%If opt==0, decryption is undertaken
%without knowledge of c, else, weighted
%phase-only decryption is applied which
%requires c to be known.
if opt==0
I_R=real(ifft2((fft2(I_R).*conj(N_R))));
I_R(1,1)=0.0;
I_G=real(ifft2((fft2(I_G).*conj(N_G))));
I_G(1,1)=0.0;
I_B=real(ifft2((fft2(I_B).*conj(N_B))));
I_B(1,1)=0.0;
else
I_R=real(ifft2((fft2(I_R).*conj(N_R)) ...
-c*Theta_R)); I_R(1,1)=0.0;
I_G=real(ifft2((fft2(I_G).*conj(N_G)) ...
-c*Theta_G)); I_G(1,1)=0.0;
I_B=real(ifft2((fft2(I_B).*conj(N_B)) ...
-c*Theta_B)); I_B(1,1)=0.0;
end
%Concatenate the RGB components to
%reconstruct a colour image, write out
%decrypt to an image file (assuming .bmp
%format), and show image (as required).
I_C = cat(3,I_R,I_G,I_B);
imwrite(I_C,’Decrypt.bmp’,’bmp’);
figure(2), imshow(I_C);
APPENDIX C
FUNCTION FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF A THREE-PASS
PROTOCOL USING PHASE-ONLY ENCRYPTION
function []=TPP(key,step,c)
%FUNCTION: Exchange Plaintext composed
%of an array of integers between two
%user - User_1 and User_2 using the
%Three-pass Protocol (TPP) with
%Phase-only Encryption
%INPUTS:
%key: Key(s) used to execute TPP where
%’key’ is a string of integer numbers
%between 0 and 9 with a maximum string
%length of 10 (the limiting upper bound
%for a MATLAB random number generator
%with a non-negative integer seed <2ˆ32)
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%step:
%step=1 - first pass (first encrypt)
%step=2 - second pass (second encrypt)
%step=3 - third pass (first decrypt)
%step=4 - decryption (second decrypt)
%c: Spectral Embedding Constant c>>1,
%user defined for the first pass only.
%Specification of c is not required
%for execution of steps 2, 3 and 4.
%Apply step 1 - first pass.
if step==1
%Read plaintext P (taken to be an
%array of integers from 0 to 9)
%from an ASCII delimited file -
%Plaintext.txt - generated by
%User_1 to be transferred to User_2.
P=dlmread(’Plaintext.txt’);
%Zero pad the first element of
%array due to re-normalisation
%condition which needs to be
%applied in step 4 when the
%first element of the decrypt
%is eliminated from the output.
zero=zeros(1,1); P=[zero P];
N=size(P’,1);%Compute size of P.
%Generate cipher using function
%’rand’ seeded for first user
%defined key.
rng(key,’twister’); Theta=rand(1,N);
%Compute phase-only spectrum POS.
POS=exp(i*angle((fft(Theta))));
%Compute phase-only encrypted
%spectrum E, embed the result
%and return the real component
%of inverse DFT.
E=(fft(P).*POS)+c*POS;
E=real(ifft(E));
%Write out first pass ciphertext
%to file which is then sent by
%User_1 to User_2
dlmwrite(’Ciphertext.txt’,E, ...
’delimiter’,’ ’,’precision’,32);
end
%Apply step 2 - second pass.
if step==2
%Read first passed ciphertext file
%(received by User_2 from User_1).
E=dlmread(’Ciphertext.txt’);
N=size(E’,1); %Compute size of array.
%Computer fft of first pass ciphertext.
E=fft(E);
%Generate new cipher using function
%’rand’ seeded by second user
%defined key.
rng(key,’twister’); Theta=rand(1,N);
%Compute phase-only encrypted
%spectrum and return real component
%of inverse DFT.
E=E.*exp(i*angle((fft(Theta))));
E=real(ifft(E));
%Write out second pass ciphertext
%to file which is then sent by
%User_2 to User_1.
dlmwrite(’Ciphertext.txt’,E, ...
’delimiter’,’ ’,’precision’,32);
end
%Apply step 3 - third pass.
if step==3
%Read second passed ciphertext file.
%(received by User_1 from User_2).
E=dlmread(’Ciphertext.txt’);
N=size(E’,1); %Compute size of array.
%Computer fft of second pass ciphertext.
E=fft(E);
%Generate cipher using function ’rand’
%seeded by first user defined key.
rng(key,’twister’); Theta=rand(1,N);
%Decrypt phase-only spectrum for
%first pass and return real
%component of inverse DFT.
E=E.*exp(-i*angle((fft(Theta))));
E=real(ifft(E));
%Write out third pass ciphertext
%to file which is then sent by
%User_1 to User_2.
dlmwrite(’Ciphertext.txt’,E, ...
’delimiter’,’ ’,’precision’,32);
end
%Apply step 4 -
%Decryption of third pass cipher.
if step==4
%Read third pass cipher from file.
%(received by User_2 from User_1).
E=dlmread(’Ciphertext.txt’);
N=size(E’,1); %Compute array size.
%Computer fft of second pass cipher.
E=fft(E);
%Generate cipher using function
%’rand’ seeded by second user
%defined key.
rng(key,’twister’); Theta=rand(1,N);
%Decrypt phase-only spectrum for
%second pass, return real component
%of inverse DFT and re-normalise by
%setting the first element of the
%array to zero.
E=E.*exp(-i*angle((fft(Theta))));
P=real(ifft(E)); P(1)=0.0;
%Convert return to integer values,
%eliminate first element and square
%brackets associated with the array.
P=round(P); P(1)=[];
%Write out decrypt to
%Plaintext.txt file.
dlmwrite(’Plaintext.txt’,P, ...
’delimiter’,’ ’); end
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